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Will Labour seize the moment? 
The election in Britain of a Labour 
government committed to what it calls 
an 'ethical foreign policy' offers 
opportunities to change UK policy 
towards East Timor and Indonesia. 
STEPHEN BARANYI, CllR's Policy 
Officer for Human Rights in Asia, 
examines the options for Labour. 
Like many British non-governmental organ-isations and several of our partners in the 
South, CIIR welcomes the signals coming 
from the new UK government on foreign and 
development policy issues. We are heartened 
by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's 
commitment to enhancing the ethical 
dimensions of British foreign policy and par-
ticularly by his promise to tighten the 
application of arms export control criteria so 
as to prevent the sale of weapons which 'might 
be used for internal repression or external 
aggression'. CIIR welcomes the statements 
by the Secretary of State for International 
Development, Clare Short, that her 
department will shift from using aid to 
promote UK trade with developing countries 
towards an emphasis on poverty reduction. 
We appreciate the new government's con-
sultative style and its pledge to ensure trans-
parency. 
On the basis of these initial signals, what 
can we expect from a Labour government 
with regard to East Timor and Indonesia? 
Promoting peace 
In his meetings with Bishop Carlos Belo of 
Dili and Jose Ramos-Horta, Special 
Representative of the National Council of 
Maubere Resistance (CNRM), Robin Cook 
pledged to support UN efforts to forge a 
comprehensive settlement to the conflict 
in East Timor. 
This is an important commitment. After 
years without progress, the Tripartite Talks 
between the governments of Indonesia and 
Portugal, and the complementary All-
inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue 
(AIETD) - both under the auspices of the 
UN Secretary-General - are entering a 
new phase (see page 6). Her Majesty's 
Government and its EU partners have 
supported these talks in the past, through 
the 1996 EU Common Position on East 
Timor and by financing the AIETD. 
Yet Britain could do much more by 
shifting from passive support to 
engagement. The UK has opportunities to 
press the parties, and particularly the 
government of Indonesia, to make 
significant concessions at the negotiating 
table . For example, Jakarta could be 
pressed to build the confidence required 
for the peace talks to move forward by 
accepting visits from UN human rights 
rapporteurs. Indonesia should be 
encouraged to take such steps when the 
UN General Assembly reconvenes in 
September, at the Asia-Europe Meeting in 
April 1998, and on several occasions in 
between. In concert with the United States, 
Japan and EU partners, the UK could also 
explore options for creating a support 
group for the Secretary-General's efforts, 
similar to the groups which provided 
critical diplomatic support for UN 
peacemaking in Central America and 
Southern Africa. 
Protecting human rights 
Despite progress at the international level, 
the human rights situation in East Timor is 
deteriorating. The resolution on East 
Timor adopted by the UN Commission on 
Hum an Rights (UNCHR) in April 1997 
clearly expresses the international 
community's concerns over persistent 
human rights violations by the Indonesian 
authorities. Britain and its EU partners 
sponsored that resolution; now it is their 
responsibility to follow up on its 
implementation. 
In this context, Cook's receptiveness to 
suggestions by British NGOs and the 
CNRM that the UK should promote on-site 
human rights monitoring is positive. The 
establishment of a UN human rights 
mission in East Timor, with a mandate to 
investigate allegations of human rights 
violations, could help change the culture 
of repression and impunity. This proposal 
should be distinguished from the idea of 
establishing a human rights office in 
Jakarta, with a vague mandate for visiting 
East Timor, as set out in the 1997 UNCHR 
resolution. Such a mechanism would be 
ineffective and could imply recognition of 
Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over East 
Timor. Yet the difficulty with on-site 
verification is that Jakarta has steadfastly 
opposed the establishment of any office, 
especially with a mandate for human rights 
monitoring, in Dili; indeed it seems 
unlikely to accept such intrusive 
Summary ' 
This issue of Timor Link examines some of 
the opportunities to promote peace, human 
rights and development in East Timor. On 
this page, CIIR's Stephen Baranyi outlines 
what Britain's new Labour government could 
do in this regard. Roger O'Keefe assesses the 
prospects of the International Court of 
lJustice issuing an advisory opinion on the East 
Timorese people's exercise of the right to 
self.·determination (pages 3-5). We also 
review a new publication assessing Northern 
voluntary organisations' efforts to create 
international pressure for peace in Angola 
and East Timor. 
Also in this issue, Akihisa Matsuno 
analyses Japanese policy towards 
Indonesia and East Timor, and argues the 
need for change (page 7). And we report 
on Bishop Belo's visit to the UK, the UN 
Decolonisation Committee hearings on 
East Timor, and the latest round of UN-
mediated talks between Indonesia and 
Portugal. 
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verification unless it were part of a larger 
package negotiated in the UN-mediated 
peace talks. 
What the l'K, its EU partners and other 
sponsors of the 1997 UNCHR resolution 
cou ld press for in the short run is the 
implementation of the resolution· s call for 
Jakarta to ·cooperate fullv with this 
Commission and its thematic rapporteurs 
and working groups, and to invite these 
[ ... ] to visit East Timor, in particular the 
Special Rapporteur on torture[ ... ].' Given 
the increase in all egations of torture in 
recent months, a visit bv rapporteur Nigel 
Rodley could make a difference on the 
ground. Pressing for 
steps to 'e nsure that 
all East Timorese in 
custody are treated hu-
manely' could also be 
of concrete assistance 
to the victims of 




As noted in the 
November 1996 report 
by the National Audit 
Office, several UK 
bilateral aid projects 
in Indonesia are 
highly questionable 
from a developmental 
standpoint. The pro-
jects which have 
aroused the greatest 
concern from MPs, 
NGOs and the CNRM 
are UK management 
training for the 
Indonesian National 
2. To redirect its assistance to Indonesia, 
particularly any assistance which might 
affect East Timor, away from 
the Indonesian government to 
independent non-governmental 
organisations which are best placed to 
promote human development and 
contribute to the elimination of 
poverty. 
These shifts would bring UK aid policy 
into line with the EU Common Position on 
East Timor. As an active member of the 
British Coalition , CIIR fully endorses this 
call for policy change. 
Police, assistance for 
regional planning in 
the context of 
Indonesia's trans-
migration programme, 
and the use of the Aid-
Trade Provision to 
smooth the way for 
commercial co.ntracts. 
The Right Honourab/,e Romn Cook, UKForeign Secretary 
We welcome the indications from the 
Secretary for International Development 
that these projects and programmes are 
under review. In July the British Coalition 
on East Timor (BCET) contributed a 
statement to the aid policy review currently 
under way. Among other things, BCET 
called on the government: 
1. To end, and not to renew, all 
government to government assistance 
to Indonesia for projects which might 
include or might affect East Timor, 
in particular projects related to 
the Indonesian government's 
transmigration policies and the training 
of the Indonesian .:\'ational Police, 
which is part of the armed forces. 
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Preventing the transfer of arms used for 
internal repression 
There is a sizeable body of opinion in the 
UK, including within the Catholic Church, 
against further weapons exports to 
Indonesia. Many believe that the sale of 
water cannons, armoured personnel 
carriers (APC~), small arms, surveillance 
equipment and Hawk jets to Indonesia 
constitutes a serious violation of the 
government's past policy of not selling 
arms that are likely to be used for internal 
repression. Some are calling for a total 
arms embargo. During his visit to the UK in 
June, Bishop Belo publicly called for 
further restriction of arms sales. 
CIIR agrees that the government should 
tighten the application of the criteria for 
granting arms export licenses so as to 
prevent the sale of any weapons which 
might be used for repression at home or 
aggression abroad. We welcome the 
government's commitment to transparency 
on licensing decisions: it is crucial for 
Parliament, and through it for society, to 
be fully informed about these matters. On 
that basis we add our voice to those of 
Amnesty International and Saferworld in 
calling for an end to the export of water 
cannons, APCs, small arms and 
surveillance equipment to Indonesia -
and to other countries where UK arms 
might be used for 
internal repression. 
We also support 
Saferworld's re-
commendation that 
the basis for the 
government's decision 
on Hawk jets be made 
public. If our 
conviction that Hawks 
have been used in East 
Timor in the past 
is correct, then no 
future sales should be 
allowed, given that 
these planes could be 
used to bomb or in-
timidate the people of 
East Timor once 
again. 
CIIR urges the 
government to extend 
this approach by 
revoking past arms 
export licences which 
contradict the new 
policy. If it can be 
shown that this would 
not oblige the 
government to pay 
onerous compensation 
to firms affected by 
the change, that would 
remove the last 
argument against 
doing so. Lastly, the 
move towards tighter 
UK arms controls should be com-
plemented by concerted diplomacy to 
enhance multilateral controls at the EU 
level and beyond. 
Coherence is the key 
Indonesia and East Timor are a test case of 
the new government's ability effectively to 
manage tensions between immediate 
economic imperatives and Britain's long 
term interest in respect for human rights, 
human development and international 
peace. Labour should seize the 
opportunity afforded by the widespread 
dissatisfaction with the old approach to 
show that it can deliver on its new, more 
coherent, vision. • 
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A challenge for the ICJ 
The results of the eighth round of 
Ministerial Talks on East Timor in June 
1996 were greeted with disappointment 
from many quarters. Jose Ramos-Horta, the 
Special Representative of the National 
Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), 
stated that instead of backing further talks 
the international community should 
persuade the UN General Assembly to 
adopt a resolution calling on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) to pass an 
advisory opinion on East Timor. ROGER 
O'KEEFE discusses whether the ICJ would 
accept such a challenge and what the 
substance of its opinion might be. Although 
the new momentum of the UN-mediated 
talks has led the CNRM to defer the option 
of a General Assembly resolution, the idea 
could be revived in 1998 if the talks do not 
yield concrete results. 
Under article 65 (1) of the Statute of the Inter-national Court of Justice, it is within the juris-
diction of the Court to give an advisory opinion 
'on any legal question'. The right to self-deter-
mination of the East Timorese people clearly 
satisfies this description, regardless ofits political 
ramifications. Therefore , the success of a 
proposed request for an advisory opinion will 
rest, not on whether the Court has the power to 
deliver an opinion on East Timor, but on whether 
it would be proper to do so in the circumstances. 
It can only be assumed that Indonesia will play 
no part in the General Assembly's referral to the 
Court of a question on East Tim or and will take 
no part in any hearings. The main objection to 
the propriety of an advisory opinion on East 
Timor is therefore likely to be the same objection 
on which the East Timor case between Portugal 
and Australia foundered in 1995: namely, that 
the Court should decline to give an opinion 
where to do so would involve evaluating the legal 
rights or obligations of a state which is not party 
to the proceedings. This principle is known to 
international lawyers as the Monetary Gold 
principle, after the leading ICJ case. Its rationale 
is that to adjudicate on the legal position of a 
state not party to a case runs counter to the well-
established doctrine, embodied in the Court's 
statute, that an international tribunal cannot 
decide a dispute between states without the 
consent of those states to its jurisdiction. 
Of course, the failed East Timar case between 
Portugal and Australia was an example of 
contentious (that is, state versus state) litigation. 
In the specific context of an advisory opinion, 
there are no parties to the case. Rather than 
coming before the Court through one state suing 
another, an advisory opinion is requested from 
the Court by a political organ of the United 
Nations (in the proposed case, the General 
Assembly), for the resolution of a legal problem 
of interest to that organ. Given the Monetary Gold 
principle, the absence of formal parties appears 
to offer a good prospect for resorting to the 
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Court's advisory jurisdiction on the question of 
East Timor. 
Nonetheless, and although advisory opinions 
are not in themselves legally binding on states, 
such opinions can effectively amount at times to 
a declaration of a particular state's international 
legal position. The resulting impact on a state's 
interests is more than merely theoretical. The 
Court's view of a particular state's rights or 
obligations may become the basis of political 
action by the UN organ which requested the 
opinion, action which can have serious practical 
consequences. In recognition of the fact that 
non-contentious opinions can compromise a 
state's legal position, the Court is sensitive to the 
principle of consent to its jurisdiction even when 
exercising its advisory function . As such, the 
Court's advisory jurisprudence has its own version 
of the Monetary Gold principle: the Eastern Carelia 
case. 
In Eastern Carelia, the old Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), which was set up 
under the League of Nations and of which the ICJ 
is declared to be a continuation, was asked to 
give an advisory opinion which required declaring 
the existence or otherwise of treaty obligations 
putatively owed to Finland by Russia. The case 
revolved around international agreements signed 
by Finland and Russia which, according to 
Finland, imposed on Russia a duty to allow its 
region of Eastern Carelia a certain degree of 
autonomy. Finland complained to the Council of 
the League of Nations that Russia was in breach 
of its duty. Russia, who was not a member of the 
League, declined an invitation to defend itself 
before the Council. 
The Council then resolved to put to the Court 
the following question: 
Do Articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty of Peace 
between Finland and Russia[ ... ] and the 
annexed Declaration of the Russian 
Delegation regarding the autonomy of 
Eastern Carelia, constitute engagements of 
an international character which place 
Russia under an obligation to Finland as to 
the carrying out of the provisions contained 
therein? 
Russia played no part in referring the question to 
the Court and refused to take part in the 
proceedings, as is open to potentially affected 
states to do. In declining to give an opinion, the 
Court reasoned that in the circ.umstances, an 
advisory opinion would have been substantially 
equivalent to deciding the dispute between the 
parties. As such, it would have run counter to 
the principle embodied in the Court's statute 
that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over 
a state, in this case Russia, with its consent. 
Along the lines of Eastern Carelia, opponents of 
a proposed East Timor advisory opinion will no 
doubt argue that any declaration from the Court 
on the right to self-determination of the people 
of East Timor would amount to the judicial 
settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and 
Portugal without Indonesia's consent. However, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
a request for an advisory opinion on the self-
determination of the East Timorese people need 
not fall foul of the Eastern Carelia principle , 
especially if the question posed does not explicitly 
impugn Indonesia's conduct. For example: 
Have the people of East Tim or yet exercised 
their right to self-determination? 
If the question is phrased in this way, the salient 
distinctions between the facts in the Eastern Carelia 
case and those relating to East Timor can be used 
to support the proposal for the ICJ to issue an 
advisory opinion . The first clear difference 
between Eastern Carelia and a potential East Timor 
advisory opinion is, in the words of the !CJ s Inter-
pretation of Pear:e Treaties opinion, that the question 
put to the Court in Eas.tern Carelia 'was directly 
related to the main point of a dispute actually 
pending between two States'. Given the wording 
of the request put to the Court, an opinion in 
that case could not possibly have been charac-
terised as anything other than a judicial 
declaration of bilateral legal obligations said to 
exist between - and only between - Finland and 
Russia. 
However, the question of whether or not the 
East Timorese people have yet exercised their 
right to self-determination does not represent 
the main point of the East Timor dispute as 
between Portugal and Indonesia. The main point of 
contention between the two states is their 
competing claims to entitlement to administer 
the territory. Legally, in any potential settlement 
of the controversy between the two, the rights of 
the people of East Timor would be no more than 
a sideline or secondary consideration. The legally 
salient assessment would be whether Portugal 
had abandoned the territory prior to Indonesian 
occupation (in a juridical act known as derelictio) 
or whether in law Indonesia can be said to have 
invaded (and to continue to occupy) what was at 
the time still Portuguese territory. The right of the 
East Timorese people to self-determination can 
be seen as a legal and factual issue in its own 
right, independent of the legal basis of the 
dispute between Portugal and Indonesia. 
The difference between the de facto dispute 
settlement in which the Court was called on to 
engage in Eastern Carelia and the more abstract 
legal and factual question that would be posed by 
a request regarding East Timor is made starker 
by a comparison of the PCIJ statute with that of 
the ICJ. The former authorised the Court to 
deliver advisory opinions on 'disputes'. This 
placed the advisory function of the PCIJ squarely 
within the context of judicial dispute settlement, 
making the absence of an unwilling party to 
advisory proceedings a more telling matter of 
propriety. For its part, the statute of the ICJ allows 
the Court to give advisory opinions on 'any legal 
question', which puts its advisory jurisdiction 
within a much broader legal context. 
Faced with a request for an advisory opinion on 
the right of the East Timorese people to self-
deterrnination, the Court would be well-placed to 
echo the view taken in the Western Sahara case: 
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The object of the General Assembly has not 
been to bring before the Court, by way of a 
request for an adYisory opinion, a dispute or 
legal controYersY, in order that it may later, 
on the basis of the Court's decision, exercise 
its powers and functions for the peaceful 
settlement of that dispute or controversy. 
The object of the request is an entirely 
different one: to obtain from the Court an 
opinion which the General Assembly deems 
of assistance to it for the proper exercise of 
its functions concerning the decolonisation 
of the territory. 
In this respect, the Court in Western Sahara paid 
particular attention to the wording of the General 
Assembly' s request-wording which a request in 
respect of East Tim or would do well to reproduce. 
It referred to, among other things, the application 
of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the 
famous declaration on the right of colonial 
peoples to self-determination. In the words of 
the Court, this located ' the legal questions of 
which the Court [was] seised[ .. . ] in a broader 
frame of reference than the settlement of a 
particular dispute. ' Similar reliance was placed on 
the wording of the General Assembly's request in 
the Namibia advisory opinion, which bears 
important similarities to East Timor's situation. 
The characterisation of the East Timor 
question as concerning the General Assembly's 
responsibility for self-determination rather than 
its role in the peaceful settlement of disputes is 
supported by the assembly's record. The right 
to self-<letermination of the people of East Timor 
has long engaged the Assembly's concern inde-
pendently of Portugal's grievances against 
Indonesia. In 1960, General Assembly resolution 
1542 (XV) placed 'Timor and dependencies' on 
the list of non-self-governing territories within 
the meaning of Chapter XI of the UN Charter. 
This meant that the General Assembly recognised 
as applicable to the territory resolution 1514 
(XV) , as complemented by resolution 1541 (XV), 
in accordance with which the people of East 
Tim or were expressly entitled to make an 'act of 
self-determination', so as freely to decide their 
future political status. 
After Indonesia occupied the territory in 1975, 
the General Assembly continued to speak of the 
controversy in terms of the self-determination 
of the East Timorese people, in resolutions 3485 
(XXX) of December 1975, 31/53 of December 
1976, 32/ 34ofNovember1977 and subsequent 
resolutions passed annually until 1982. Similarly, 
Security Council resolutions 384 ( 1975) and 389 
(1976) , which called on Indonesia to withdraw 
from the territory, expressly reaffirmed the 
inalienable right of the East Timorese people to 
self-determination and called on all states to 
recognise this right. East Timor remains on the 
list of non-self-governing territories within the 
meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, and the 
General Assembly's Special Committee on the 
Situation with Regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (' the 
Decolon isation Committee ' ) continues to 
deliberate on East Timor. It is clear, therefore, 
that the right to self-determination of the East 
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Timorese people has long been a topic of 
concern to the General Assembly in a manner 
quite distinct from its role in calling for a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute between Portugal and 
Indonesia. The Court should have little difficulty 
in holding to this \~ew . 
Opponents of an East Timor advisory opinion 
might counter that delivering an opinion on a 
question framed as addressing the rights held 
by the East Timorese people, while not 'sub-
stantially equivalent to deciding the dispute 
between [Indonesia and Portugal] ' , unavoidably 
involves a decision, in Indonesia's absence, on its 
substantive legal rights and obligations. In the 
words of the Interpretation of Peace Treaties and 
Western Sahara cases, 'the legal position of the 
State which has refused its consent to the 
proceedings ' will be 'compromised by the 
answers that the Court may give to the question 
put to it.' It might well be argued, most drastically, 
that a finding that the people of East Timor have 
not made a genuine act of self-<letermination in 
favour of integration into Indonesia would be 
equivalent to a declaration of the Indonesian 
state's responsibility for denying since 1975 their 
inalienable right to do so. It might therefore be 
objected, as in the East Timor contentious 
proceedings between Portugal and Australia, 
that the Court cannot give an opinion that 
requires it to evaluate the lawfulness of the 
conduct of another state not party to the case, 
'even if the right in question is a right erga omnes,' 
as it is here - that is, a right enforceable not just 
on Indonesia but on all states, including Portugal 
as the territory's recognised Administering Power. 
Yet the fact that a state's rights will be affected 
by the Court's ruling does not necessarily make 
it improper for the Court to give an opinion. In 
the words of the Monetary Gof,d case, as affirmed 
in the Nicaragua, Frontier Dispute and Nauru cases, 
a concern for the principle of consent to the 
Court's jurisdiction will only prevent the Court 
from making a decision where the legal interests 
of the non-consenting state 'would not only be 
affected by a decision, but would form the very 
subject-matter of the decision.' For a state's legal 
interests to constitute 'the very subject-matter' 
of the Court's decision, it must be the case that 
the Court has to rule on these interests before it 
can determine the question put to it. That is, it is 
not enough that the Court's opinion would result 
in a simultaneous determination of the legal 
interests ofa non-consenting state. For Monetary 
Gof,d/ Eastern Carelia to be invoked, the Court's 
ruling must depend on a prior determination of 
those legal interests. 
On these grounds it should be possible to 
circumvent the Eastern Carelia principle and, in 
doing so, to distinguish an advisory opinion on 
the East Timor situation from Portugal's failed 
case against Australia in respect of the territory. 
In that case, Portugal's submission centred on 
the unlawfulness of Australia's entry into the 
Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia. The unlaw-
fulness of Australia's action depended on whether 
or not Indonesia had the power to make treaties 
in respect of East Timor, which in turn depended 
on whether it was entitled to exercise sovereignty 
over the territory. In the final analysis, therefore, 
an assessment of Indonesia's sovereign rights 
over East Timor was a prerequisite to determining 
the ultimate question of whether Australia's entry 
into the treaty was unlawful. As Indonesia was 
not a party to the proceedings, the Court ruled 
that it would be improper to answer the question. 
In contrast, an advisory opinion on the right 
to self-determination of the East Timorese 
people need not depend on an assessment of 
Indonesia's legal rights and obligations, in the 
sense that such an assessment is a logical 
prerequisite to a decision. Borrowing the 
words of the Nauru case, 'a finding by the 
Court[ .. . ] might well have implications for the 
legal situation of [Indonesia], but no finding 
in respect of that legal situation will be needed 
as a basis for the Court's decision.' A decision 
as to whether or not the people of East Timor 
have yet exercised their right to self-
determination need only focus factually on 
whether the act of self-<letermination alleged 
to have been made by their representatives on 
31 May 1976 was genuine or, alternatively, 
whether any such subsequent act has been 
genuinely made. If the answer to both 
questions is no, the Court will simply be 
required to declare that the East Timorese 
have not yet exercised that right. Obviously, 
this will simultaneously amount to a declaration 
of Indonesia's legal position. Yet this would be 
a logical corollary of the Court's 
determination and not a basis for it. 
A further and crucial point of distinction 
between Eastern Carelia and the proposed advisory 
opinion - and a seminal difference between the 
Court's contentious and advisory jurisdictions-
was highlighted in the Western Sahara advisory 
opinion. Substituting 'Indonesia' for 'Spain', the 
pertinent passage reads: 
In other respects, [Indonesia] 's position 
in relation to the present proceedings 
finds no parallel in the circumstances of 
the advisory proceedings concerning the 
Status of Eastern Carelia in 1923. In that 
case, one of the States concerned was 
[not], at the time, a Member of the 
League of Nations, and lack of 
competence of the League to deal with a 
dispute involving non-member States 
which refused its intervention was a 
decisive reason for the Court's declining 
to give an answer. In the present case, 
[Indonesia] is a Member of the United 
Nations and has accepted the provisions 
of the Charter and Statute; it has thereby 
in general given its consent to the exercise 
by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction. 
It[ ... ] could not validly object to the 
General Assembly's exercise of its powers 
to deal with the decolonisation of a non-
self-governing territory and to seek an 
opinion on questions relevant to the 
exercise of those powers. 
The view that article 96 of the UN Charter 
constitutes a member state's a frrinri consent to the 
Court's advisory jurisdiction was also expressed 
in the Namibia opinion. It is perhaps the strongest 
ground on which to distinguish such cases from 
the Eastern Carelia case. 
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In the final analysis, as the Court made explicit 
in the Western Sahara case, there is a strong 
presumption in favour of the Court helping to 
solve a problem confronting the General 
Assembly. Furthermore, it is encouraging to bear 
in mind that, despite the tenacity of the principle 
it laid down, Easfi?m Carelia itself remains the only 
case in which the Court has declined to give an 
advisory opinion on the grounds that to do so 
would amount to-deciding a dispute between 
states without the consent of one of them. It is also 
heartening to recall the outcome of one earlier 
and substantially similar legal struggle. In 1971, 
despite the obvious implications for South 
Africa's interests, the Court agreed to deliver its 
famous Namima advisory opinion, on the basis 
of a request made by the General Assembly in 
the wake of bitterly disappointing contentious 
proceedings. 
Yet what would be the practical use of a 
declaration by the Court that the people of East 
Timor have not yet exercised their right to self-
determination? Have not the General Assembly, 
the Decolonisation Committee and the Security 
Council (in a non-Chapter VII resolution), 
already said as much? The simple answer to this 
is that, while assessment by such bodies constitutes 
a valid political determination of the question, 
there has never been a conclusive legal statement 
on the issue because these bodies are not 
competent to make one. In the recent East Timor 
litigation, the fact that the East Timorese were still 
entitled to exercise their right to self-determi-
nation was not in dispute between the parties 
and the ICJ stated that its finding was ' [ w] ithout 
prejudice to the question whether the resolutions 
under discussion could be binding in nature.' 
Furthermore, while East Timor remains on the 
agenda of the Decolonisation Committee, the 
legal validity of its presence there is hotly 
contested by Indonesia, as the Committee's most 
recent session illustrates (see page 6). 
A statement by the Court would put the legal 
situation beyond doubt. A declaration of the 
legal position would in turn give renewed political 
momentum to the issue. Indeed, the moral 
weight of an opinion in favour of the East 
Timorese people would make it difficult for the 
General Assembly not to take action on the basis 
of the Court's finding. 
As to the facts of the East Tim or situation, it is 
a matter of conjecture what finding the ICJ might 
make, although everything seems to point to the 
conclusion that the people of the territory have 
not yet exercised their right to self-determina-
tion. If such a finding were to be made, there 
would be intense pressure on the General 
Assembly to call for a UN-supervised referendum 
in the territory, so as to enable the people of East 
Timor freely to determine their future political 
status. In the end, an advisory opinion on East 
Timor might indeed bear the same historical 
fruit as that borne in respect of Namibia. • 
• Roger O'Keefe is a PhD candidate in in tema-
tional law at Magdalene College, 
Cambridge, UK. Many thanks to the 
readers who commented on this paper 
anonymously. 
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EAST TIMOR: lime for change 
Timor, area 7 ,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal began decolonising East 
Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. A small third party, Apodeti, 
was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene 
if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 
1975, however, Fretilin was in control of 
virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following 
the defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West T1D1or 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Amtralia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Tim.or was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as illegal. 
The invasion and annexation of East Timor 
has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third 
of the population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian rule. But the majority of TIDlorese 
have not accepted subjugation: Indonesia has 
been unable to eliminate the desire of the East 
Timorese for self.determination and an anned 
resistance movement still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been condemned 
by successive UN resolutions, the international 
community has done little or nothing to 
implement them, given the major economic 
and geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status - it has the world's fifth largest 
population, and large reserves of oil and other 
natural resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Timor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited 
the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of East 
Timor by the UN, created huge expectations 
of change. To great disappointment in East 
Timor, the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dill, the East TIDlorese 
capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed 
by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz~ 
provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN secretary-general has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased presmire 
to reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese under the auspices of the UN. 
5 
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Bishop Belo in London 
In June 1997 Bishop Carlos Belo visited the 
United Kingdom as part of a longer tour of 
Europe and the United States. IAN LINDEN, 
Director of CllR, reflects on the bishop and 
his message. 
Bishop Bela's visit to Britain was timely. By coincidence, World in Action, ITV's 
flagship documentary programme, was 
broadcasting an investigation of Britain's 
covert arms trade. It revealed the extent of 
British exports of military equipment to 
Indonesia designed for repression of the 
civilian population in Indonesia and East 
Timar. 
In a speech for the CAFOD millennium 
campaign, Bishop Belo spoke with great 
passion about this trade. 'As pastor in East 
Timar, whose people have suffered terribly 
from the effects of armaments made in 
countries far from our shores, I appeal to 
the government of the United Kingdom, 
and to its allies - whose factories make a 
variety of weapons which are then sold for 
use on land , sea and in the air - to 
consider the dreadful consequences of this 
so-called defence industry. Please, I beg 
INTERNATIONAL ROUND-UP 
you , restrict further the conditions under 
which such trade is permitted. 
'Our small nation of East Timar has 
suffered much at the hands of military 
forces largely supplied with their 
armaments by Western countries such as 
the United States and the United 
Kingdom,' he said. 'Their provision has 
given both practical and moral support for 
abuses that have taken place.' 
But the bishop's concern about the 
military might deployed against his people 
extends beyond the gross abuses of human 
rights and the death of over a third of the 
East Timorese population, to the prospect 
for negotiations . He told me he was 
convinced that 'for a proper and fruitful 
dialogue to proceed a prerequisite is the 
drastic reduction, even complete withdrawal, 
of the armed forces[ ... ] . To propose a 
reconciliation which did not attend to the 
realities of the moral disorder which has 
been and continues to be perpetrated, would 
be a form of collusion with it.' 
The pressure the Indonesian authorities 
exert on Bishop Belo extends from constant 
routine surveillance to angry letters of 
Same old hearings ... 
This year's hearings on East Timar by the UN Decolonisation Committee 
took place one month earlier but that was 
the only change in the usual proceedings. 
When the hearings opened on 16 June the 
Indonesian Ambassador objected to 
consideration of East Timar by the 
committee; the Chairman denied his 
petition. Later, the Ambassador reiterated 
his government's position that the 
Timorese had exercised their right to self-
determination by choosing to integrate 
into the Republic of Indonesia in 1976, 
that Jakarta had invested in the 
development of the territory and that 
hum an rights were protected by laws 
applying to the entire country. Several 
Timorese living in the territory expressed 
support for this view. 
The Portuguese Ambassador to the UN 
questioned these claims and called for a 
genuine act of self-determination. His 
position was supported b y resistance 
leaders in exile , including Jose Ramos-
Horta, who urged the government of 
Indonesia to adopt confidence-building 
measures . These included reducing its 
military forces and allowing the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to 
establish a presence on the island to 
create the conditions for a negotiated 
solution to the conflict. Several NGOs 
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condemned human rights violations, 
which appear to have increased since the 
Indonesian general elections on 29 May. 
Some petitioners called on the committee 
to take specific action , such as 
encouraging the government of Indonesia 
to establish an independent truth 
commission to investigate past human 
rights violations. Apparently they were 
oblivious to the fact that the committee 
has never taken any action on East Timar 
aside from its annual hearings. In keeping 
with this tradition, the committee 
concluded its hearings by deciding to 
include the question of East Timar on the 
provisional agenda of its next session in 
1998. 
... but new talks? 
On 19 June, the foreign ministers oflndonesia 
and Portugal met for their ninth round of 
Tripartite Talks under UN auspices. The 
discussions, the first under the chairmanship 
of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
generated some procedural advances. First, the 
foreign ministers agreed that the talks would 
continue at the 'working level', beginning on 
28 July. These talks were to involve senior 
officials from each country's foreign ministry, 
assisted by their permanent representatives to 
the United Nations, under the chairmanship 
of Jamsheed Marker, the Personal 
denunciation when his interventions in the 
international arena do change hearts and 
minds. He is such an effective advocate of 
the East Timorese cause both because he 
seems to carry the burden of this pressure 
lightly, and because he is sensitive to the 
demands it makes on him. This is not 
merely careful diplomacy but also stems 
from a profound Christian conviction. 'We 
must never preclude the possibility of good 
will on the part of others, even those who 
have brought suffering upon us,' he told the 
CAFOD audience. 
He is sanguine about the prospects for 
successful negotiations. He wants East 
Timor to take its 'proper place in the 
family of nations' and has called for a 
'more adequate testing of public opinion' 
to determine what form this might take. 
But he has a sober realism about how 
much can be achieved in the short term. 
Nonetheless, as the BBC taxi took him 
off through the South London traffic for 
yet another interview, it occurred to me 
that from a Christian perspective, the God 
in which the nation of East Timar seems to 
put its trust is a God of suprises. • 
Representative of the Secretary-General. The 
officials will cover a range ofissues including 
economic development, human rights and 
migration. Their week-long sessions will take 
place in conditions of strict confidentiality, 
and any agreements reached will remain 
subject to approval by superiors. The foreign 
ministers will reconvene for direct talks as 
required. 
Second, the ministers agreed that 
another round of the All-inclusive Intra-
East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) would be 
convened in August or in the autumn. 
Participation would be expanded by five 
persons to include representatives of youth 
and women, and a replacement would be 
selected for a participant who died since 
the last session. Marker will consult various 
Timorese organisations regarding 
candidates for these positions. It was 
emphasised that the AIETD would have to 
stick to its narrow terms of reference, 
meaning that it will not be allowed to 
touch on political issues such as self-
determination. 
Indeed, this last stipulation and the 
statements made at the Decolonisation 
Committee serve as reminders that despite 
procedural advances and the new 
peacemaking activism of the UN, the 
protagonists remain far apart on 
substantive matters. • 
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Tokyo's cautious diplomacy 
Despite a minor shift in 1995, when it 
began to support UN mediation efforts in 
East Timor, Japan's policy on the territory 
has prioritised good relations with 
Indonesia over human rights concerns. 
AKIHISA MATSUNO analyses Japan's 
diplomacy and recommends change. 
Before 1995, Japan officially held that it was in no position to make judgements 
on sovereign ty in East Timor. It did not 
recognise Indonesia's annexation of East 
Timor and supported the first Security 
Council reso lution condemning the 
annexation in Decem b er 1975. But it 
voted against all subsequent UN Security 
Council and General Assembly resolutions 
on the grounds that criticising Indonesia 
does not by itself contribute to a solution. 
In November 1995 , at the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation summit in Osaka, then 
Foreign Minister Yohei Kohno told his 
Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas, that Japan 
would henceforth support UN mediation efforts 
in East Timar. Japan put the new policy into 
effect by providing funds for the All-Inclusive 
Intra-East Timorese Dialogue. 
The solidarity movement and parliamentari-
ans who had worked to change government 
policy towards East Timor welcomed the shift 
and saw it as a result of their long and tenacious 
efforts to influence policy. Behind the change 
must lie feelings that silence and neglect have not 
solved the problem and that some action is 
required. 
Bilateral relations, not human rights 
The policy shift, however, has meant little in 
practice. Last April, at the 53rd session of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), 
Japan abstained on the resolution on 'East Timor. 
Japan and South Korea were the only two Asian 
members to abstain. All other Asian states voted 
against the resolution, in solidarity with 
Indonesia. 
Some would argue that Japan was simply trying, 
as it usually does, to maintain a balance between 
its relations with Asia and Western countries. 
But this is not always the case. Until last year, 
Japan co-sponsored the resolution on China 
together with Western countries. This year,Japan 
sided with the West in voting against the no-
action motion on China. In 1993, Japan had 
voted for the no-action motion on East Timar. 
The motion was defeated. 
Before this year's UNCHR session , 
Japanese foreign ministry officials explained 
that the difference in attitudes to China and 
East Timor arose from the difference in the 
nature of the two issues. East Timar is on the 
UN agenda while the human rights situation 
in China is not. Although the officials were 
unwilling to clarify their statements, the most 
likely interpretation is that they feel 
di scussion of East Timor at the UNCHR 
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might harm the mediation process by 
embarrassing Indonesia. 
·Japanese foreign ministry officials have also 
tried to defend Indonesia by pointing to 
improvements in East Timar, citing the estab-
lishment in Dili of a branch of the Indonesian 
National Commission on Human Rights. But 
further examples of improvement are hard to 
find, and the officials neglect to mention that the 
commission's Dili office is not functioning 
because it is located in front of the military 
command. 
Japan 's decision to abstain on the UNCHR 
East Timar resolution seems to be largely 
determined by concern for bilateral relations 
with Indonesia, rather than by an assessment of 
the realities of human rights. 
One problem is the lack of a policy on 
international human rights issues. 
Coordination on human rights diplomacy 
scarcely exists. The foreign ministry's Division 
on Human Rights and Refugees is supposed 
to deal with UNCHR and international 
human rights issues, but has insufficient 
power to coordinate the views of oth er 
departments. On country specific issues, the 
ministry's geographic divisions have more say. 
On human rights conventions, the main 
obstacle is the justice ministry, which regards 
any binding international procedure or 
protocol as a threat to Japan 's judicial 
sovereignty. In all policy making processes, 
human rights concerns are too weak to make 
much impact and lack any institutional 
guarantee. 
More than pragmatic complicity 
It is economic and political ties with Jakarta 
that determine Japanese policy on East 
Timar. The importance the Japanese 
government attaches to Indonesia is reflected 
in aid policy: Indonesia is the top recipient of 
Japanese aid, receiving some 15-17 per cent 
of Japan's total overseas aid budget each year. 
Indonesia is an important oil and gas 
supplier and a promising market for Japanese 
products and capital. It also holds one side of 
the Malacca Straits, which are vital for a 
continuous supply of energy to Japan. 
An official of the Japanese foreign 
ministry's Indonesia team once said that the 
independence of East Timor would not 
damage Japan's interest. The important thing 
is that Indonesia shou ld not get angry. 
Perhaps this is what the ruling elites have 
demanded of diplomacy: to maintain stable 
relations with whatever regime rules 
Indonesia. 
But foreign mm1stry officials have 
sometimes gone beyond such pragmatic 
complicity. They often defend Indonesia 
vigorously and are willing to help create an 
atmosphere favourable to its rulers. 
Officials specialising in Indonesia tend to 
hold a deep affection towards the country, 
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and to share the feelings that prevail among 
Indonesians, and the elite in particular. They 
become sympathetic to Indonesian nation-
building and its xenophobic discourse. 
In 1994, a Japan ese offic ia l from the 
embassy in Jakarta, acting as interpreter for a 
group of Japanese parliamentarians visiting 
East Timar, was found to have twisted what 
the parliamentarians, and Indonesian civilian 
and military officials, said during the visit. 
After a press conference in Bali at the end of 
the visit, Indonesian newspapers reported 
that all the Japanese parliamentarians were 
happy with the situation in East Timor. Later, 
the conference tapes were checked and a 
scandal broke. Foreign Minister Kohno, after 
personally checking the parliamentarians' 
report on the manipulations, had to make an 
official apology. 
Another case of excessive sympathy is more 
recent. On 19 June this year, the Indonesian 
news agency Antara reported that a First 
Secretary at the Japanese embassy in Jakarta 
had condemned the shooting of Indonesian 
security forces' personnel by the Timorese 
resistance as a violation of human rights. 
'Even a violation of international law,' he 
affirmed. 'Our report, written after the visit 
to Timtim, will be forwarded to the United 
Nations to contribute to efforts in finding a 
solution for the former Portuguese colony.' 
The Indonesian authorities used his 
statements to strengthen their position . 
These excesses might not be government 
policy, but part of the foreign ministry's 
practice. 
Linkage is needed 
While it supports the UN mediation efforts, it is 
still extremely difficult for the Japanese 
government to do anything that directly affects 
bilateral relations with Indonesia. The solidarity 
movement has always demanded thatJapan's 
aid to Indonesia be linked to human rights in 
East Timar. This is in accordance with the so-
called Official Development Assistance Charter, 
a set of loose guidelines which refers to human 
rights in recipient countries. But after 10 years 
of campaigning, the flow of aid to Indonesia 
continues unabated. 
Indonesia's image has recently worsened 
because of the national car project, 
repression against opposition leader 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, violence during the 
general elections and, perhaps, East Timar. 
But these are not enough to make the 
Japanese government reconsider its aid policy 
to Indonesia. Japan · supported President 
Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines until the 
very last moment. It is to be hoped that 
Japanese politicians and bureaucrats will not 
repeat the same mistake. • 
• Akihisa Matsuno is a member of the Free East 




fry S atasha Pearce 
Making Solidarity Effective. Northern 
voluntary organisations, policy advocacy 
and the promotion of peace in Angola and 
East Timor 
Stephen Barami, Steve Kibble, Arnold Kohen 
and Kathryn O 'Neill . CIIR, 1997. 
For anyone with an interest in policy advocacy, Making Solidari f_)' Effective is a must. After 
stating its aims, which include clarification of 
terms such as 'policy advocacy' and advancing 
the debate on how to assess advocacy, the paper 
launches into a comprehensive review of the 
literature. The authors adopt the term Northern 
voluntary organisations (NVOs) to include all 
Northern NGOs, churches, labour organisa-
tions , solidarity groups and other voluntary 
organisations. The paper assesses the efforts of 
this diverse group. 
The authors construct their own criteria for 
measuring impact. They distinguish between 
three types of impact in both North and South 
- impact on capacity-building, impact on 
declaratory policy and implementation impact 
- and allow for three levels of impact for each 
indicator: low, moderate and high. 
The authors assess the impact of NVOs ' 
advocacy work in two specific cases. The two case 
studies, on Angola (by Kathryn O'Neill) and on 
East Timor (Arnold Kohen and Stephen 
. Baranyi) provide a brief history of each country's 
liberation struggle, drawing out other countries' 
involvement and position. 
Kohen and Baranyi 's case study of East Timor 
shows how NGO advocacy has evolved. In the 
1970s, there was little church activity on the 
issue and although secular solidarity groups' 
advocacy had a moderate impact on certain 
governments and UN Security Coun cil and 
General Assembly declarations, there was little 
implementation impact on the ground. 
The 1980s was a period of much capacity 
building, particularly with regard to the Catholic 
church in East Timor and church-affiliated 
organisations in Australia, Europe and North 
America. Stronger links were also built between 
the churches and secular organisations. Imple-
mentation impact was still low, however, and 
declaratory impact was smaller than in the 1970s. 
Arms sales to Indonesia increased in many 
countries, including Britain. 
The Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 , caught on 
film by Max Stahl, shocked the world. The 
increased media coverage, along with NVO 
activitv, achieved high impact on declarations by 
manv countries, although this has led to only a 
moderate implementation impact. 
Many of the case study's observations are dis-
heartening for those involved in advocacy 
because the area of capacity building is the only 
catego~· sho't't'ing consistent progress towards 
high impact . Howe\·er , there is room for 
optimism. :\\'Os have done much to keep the 
issue alive. Indeed, much of the media coverage 
would not have been achieved without NVO 
advocacy and awareness raising. With a new 
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Labour government, there is also renewed hope 
that a change in Britain 's arms sales to Indonesia 
may be forth coming. 
The final aim of the authors is to identify 
strategic lessons which can be applied to these 
and other cases. O'Neill and Kohen and Baranyi 
conclude that public awareness and support is 
essential for NVOs to achieve any impact. They 
also conclude that NVOs should have achievable 
policy goals. As joint efforts are likely to have a 
greater impact that individual action, the 
authors recommend that there should be 
greater links between NVOs, Southern voluntary 
organisations and the people and organisations 
in the countries concerned. 
Eminently readable and informative, this 
paper stresses that NVOs rarely undertake 
systematic evaluation of the results of their 
advocacy. Evaluation is difficult and complex, 
and the authors are admirably self-critical about 
their own efforts in this field. This is clearly an 
area for much improvement and NVOs would 
do well to take on board some of the recom-
mendations here. • 
• Making Solidarity Effective, by Stephen Baranyi, 
Steve Kibble, Arnold Kohen and Kathryn 
O'Neill , can be ordered for £3.00 + 60p 
postage and packing from CIIR. 
Arms sales: A global 
perspective 
Arms Trade to a Military Regime: 
Indonesia 
European Network Against Arms Trade 
(ENAAT) 
A product of collaboration between campaigners 
in a variety of Western countries, this second 
publication by the ENAAT is a welcome addition 
to the documentation on security cooperation 
with Indonesia. Separate chapters on nine 
European countries, two North American 
countries and Australia provide a wide-ranging 
international perspective on this issue. 
Three tendencies emerge. First, we see how 
the Suharto regime has used its market size and 
strategic location to play suppliers off against 
each other and thereby expand arms trade and 
military training relationships with a range of 
Western countries. Second, readers are shown 
how Western governments systematically evade 
multilateral arms export guidelines and their 
own arms control policies, where these exist, in 
order to secure arms sales and other lucrative 
contracts \\1th Indonesia. Finally, and this is 
perhaps the most innovative part of the book, 
many of the authors document the emergence 
of campaigns against such weapons exports in 
different countries. 
One limitation of this otherwise useful book 
is its failure rigorously to analyse the relationship 
between these campaigns and the policies they 
seek to change. In order to build the interna-
tional campaign which the authors rightly call 
for, it is necessary to distinguish between 
strategies which have led to policy change, and 
those which have proven to be fruitless, in 
different settings. Perhaps the study of advocacy 
effectiveness by CUR, reviewed above, may help 
in this regard. • 
e Arms Trade to a Military Regime: Jndunesia can be 
ordered from the European Network Against 
Arms Trade (ENAAT) , Pesthuislaan 39, 1054 
RH Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Tel/fax: 
3120-616-4684. E-mail: amokmar@antenna.nl. 
Honouring the struggle for 
peace 
East Timor Nobel Peace Prize: Lectures 
delivered at the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize 
awarding ceremony 
Although the speeches by Bishop Carlos Belo 
andjose Ramos-Horta have circulated widely 
since they were made in December last year, this 
compilation of the final texts is welcome for 
several reasons. First, it brings together all key 
documents from that historic ceremony, 
including the speech by Francis Sejersted, 
Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee. 
Second, it contains the definitive curricula vitae 
of the laureates, which many agencies will find 
useful in responding to media inquiries. Third, 
since it contains these documents in English 
and Portuguese, the book will be of use to organ-
isations worldwide and especially to the 
Timorese, who still have difficulty gaining access 
to these texts. • 
e East Timar Nobel Peace Prize: Lectures delivered at 
the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize awarding ceremony can 
be ordered from Ediciaoes Colibri, Facultade 
de Letras, Alameda da Universidade, 1699 
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